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ABSTRACT 
As part of preparing for the Crew Exploration Vehicle 
(CEV), the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) worked on developing the 
requirements to manage the fire risk.  The new CEV 
poses unique challenges to current fire protection 
systems.  The size and configuration of the vehicle 
resembles the Apollo capsule instead of the current 
Space Shuttle or the International Space Station.  The 
smaller free air volume and fully cold plated avionic bays 
of the CEV requires a different approach in fire 
protection than the ones currently utilized.  The fire 
protection approach discussed in this paper incorporates 
historical lessons learned and fire detection and 
suppression system design philosophy spanning from 
Apollo to the International Space Station.   Working with 
NASA fire and materials experts, this approach outlines 
the best requirements for both the closed out area of the 
vehicle, such as the avionics bay, and the crew cabin 
area to address the unique challenges due to the size 
and configuration of the CEV.  
INTRODUCTION 
A fire event in a manned spacecraft is a serious 
concern.  The small crew cabin combined with an 
elevated oxygen atmosphere can allow a fire to 
propagate quickly and poses a severe threat for the 
crew and vehicle.  The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) 
is going to have a smaller crew cabin volume than the 
current Space Shuttle and will see a higher oxygen 
concentration when going to the moon.  Lunar missions 
will drive vehicle designs to have lower cabin 
atmospheric pressure and as a result, an enriched 
oxygen concentration in the environment.  The Apollo 
Crew Module (CM) had an environment with 100% 
oxygen with a 6.4 psia atmosphere.  The CEV is 
proposed to have a 30% oxygen environment with a 
10.4 psia atmosphere for lunar missions.   
The enriched oxygen atmosphere and smaller cabin of 
the CEV requires rethinking the fire protection approach 
as compared to the current Space Shuttle and the 
International Space Station (ISS).  Before looking at the 
CEV fire protection approach, an understanding of the 
historical and current fire protection systems that has 
been implemented on various NASA’s manned space 
vehicle is essential.  Incorporating past experiences and 
lessons is central to getting the best design. 
PAST AND PRESENT 
Historically, fire protection has incorporated three levels 
of protection: Fire Prevention, Fire Detection, and Fire 
Suppression.  Fire Prevention is the first and most 
significant level of protection.  It is based on the ability to 
design your vehicle and system in a way that minimizes 
the risk of fire ignition.  This is the foundation of any 
vehicle’s approach to managing fire related risks.  Fire 
Detection is the ability to detect a in the unfortunate case 
that a fire is ignited.  The faster the fire is detected, the 
faster a response can be made and the damage limited.  
In space however, fire detection is not a simple task, as 
smoke and heat do not rise up in microgravity.  Fire 
Suppression is the final level of protection and is there 
when the worst of the worst happens.  The ability to stop 
and put out a fire as quickly as possible without putting 
the crew in danger is crucial for keeping the vehicle and 
crew safe. 
To understand how each of the three levels of protection 
work with one another and enable a successful fire 
protection strategy, a historical look at previous manned 
vehicles is beneficial for selecting the most effective fire 
protecting approach for the CEV.  The following 
historical look at Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Space Shuttle 
and ISS will only scratch the surface of the massive 
amount of studies and the years of developmental work 
behind each of the fire protection systems.   
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FIRE PREVENTION 
To understand how to prevent fires, one needs to first 
understand what is necessary for a fire to occur.  Fire, 
both on the ground and in microgravity, requires three 
ingredients, as represented by the familiar fire triangle: 
fuel, ignition, and oxygen.  Remove and controlling any 
of these ingredients necessary have been the foundation 
of fire prevention.   
In Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo controlling the 
ingredients for a fire was difficult.  All three of the 
vehicles were designed for 100% oxygen environment.  
Oxygen, necessary for crew survival, cannot be 
removed.  Thus, Mercury and Gemini’s fire protection 
strategy were state-or-the-art non-flammable materials 
of the time and safe practices to prevent any ignition 
source.   
This was the approach until the Apollo 1 fire happened, 
when an unexpected ignition occurred and the state-of-
the-art materials were exposed to 16.2 psia 100% 
oxygen environment in which they had never been 
tested.  After Apollo 1 fire, two major lessons were 
learned.  The first is that no matter how well ignition 
source are controlled, an ignition source will always 
exist.  The second is that materials flammability needs to 
be tested at the worst case conditions to which the 
material will be exposed.  Subsequent to the accident, 
materials, components and subsystems were 
redesigned and tested to improve fire safety.  Apollo still 
required a 6.2 psia 100% oxygen environment on orbit, 
but made the vehicle safer on the launch pad by limiting 
the oxygen concentration.  Apollo went as far as building 
a complete CM mockup with flight materials and 
conducting CM level flammability tests. 
The Space Shuttle and ISS both have strict material 
flammability requirements which are verified through 
standard tests.  They also have a less hazardous 
atmosphere with a maximum of 25.9% oxygen at 14.7 
psia and 30% oxygen at 10.2 psia.  For materials that 
don’t meet the flammability requirements, there is 
propagation path control where flammable materials are 
isolated from ignition sources or any other flammable 
material by a specific distance.   
A major source of ignition sources on any space 
vehicles are electrical and electromechanical 
subsystems.  The ISS, designed as a space laboratory, 
has high power busses and systems and they are kept 
fire safe not only by material selection but also ignition 
source control.  This is done by using a Fault Detection, 
Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) architecture and also 
Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) part 
selection to meet de-rating and current protection 
requirements.  FDIR detects and shuts down failures 
before ignition can occur in the subsystem while EEE 
part requirements assures properly selected parts and 
components to reduce risk of the parts becoming an 
ignition source. 
FIRE DETECTION 
When Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo were designed, fire 
detection technology was still immature and the most 
reliable system available was the crew nose.  The fire 
protection strategy required the crew to detect a fire and 
take action to suppress it.   
Skylab was the first manned vehicle to incorporate a fire 
detection method due to the larger volume and more 
complicated systems.  It utilized a line-of-sight 
radiometer that detected ultraviolet wavelength 
generated by OH radicals generated by a fire. 
The Space Shuttle was the first vehicle to use 
commercial ionization-type smoke detector.  Unlike fire 
detectors on the ground, fire detector utilization in 
microgravity is difficult.  Generally fire detection on the 
ground detects heat, smoke, flame, or particles, all of 
which are difficult to detect without movement of air.  In 
the gravitational field of the earth, natural convection 
generates an upward airflow from the fire making 
detection easier.  In microgravity, natural convection 
does not exist and forced air flow is required to allow for 
the use smoke/particle detectors.  The Shuttle has 
several separate forced air loops in the various avionics 
bays and the crew cabin to generate the airflow required 
to transport smoke particles to the detector. 
The ISS also utilizes the same fire detection strategy as 
the shuttle, using particulate smoke detectors in forced 
air loops.  Instead of avionic bays, the ISS has avionics 
throughout housed in racks.  Those racks that require 
forced air cooling for the avionics have built in particle 
detectors in the forced air loop.  In the general crew area 
of the ISS, there are various particle smoke detectors 
placed throughout the various modules.  CFD analysis is 
necessary to make sure the air ventilation rate in the 
modules will transport smoke particles to the detectors, 
making sure there isn’t any object blocking the 
detectors. 
FIRE SUPPRESSION 
Fires can be suppressed in four basic methods: 
removing the fuel, removing the oxygen, cooling the 
reaction, or inhibiting the reaction chemically.  All four 
methods have been used on various manned vehicles.  
Mercury and Gemini had potable water available as a 
fire suppression method.  There was no dedicated fire 
suppression system, but in the high oxygen 
concentration environment of these vehicles, water was 
the only effective suppressant.  Water essentially cools 
the reaction and stops the fire from propagating.   
Apollo introduced a water and foam hand-held fire 
extinguisher which used cellulous gel to form the foam 
when sprayed.  It works by cooling the reaction and 
stops the fire from propagating.  The same type of water 
foam extinguisher was used by Skylab. 
Space Shuttle introduced a halogenerated hydrocarbon 
(Halon) fire extinguisher.  The advantage of the Halon 
fire extinguisher is that the gaseous base suppressant 
can be used to flood the crammed avionic bays with a 
chemical that inhibits further combustion chain reaction.  
This is more effective than a water foam extinguisher 
which would not be able to flood an avionics bay as 
effectively.   
While the Halon fire extinguisher system receives more 
focus on the Shuttle, there is actually a fire response 
system that happens first.  When a fire is detected on 
the Shuttle, the forced air system is shut down.  The 
same microgravity effect that makes detection difficult is 
also a great fire suppression method.  The lack of 
natural convection in microgravity can starve the fire of 
oxygen and extinguish it.  As the fire burns and uses up 
the surrounding oxygen, there isn’t any airflow to bring in 
new oxygen.  Halon is used only after determining that 
the fire did not self extinguish.   
The ISS also cuts off airflow at the detection of a fire.  
However, ISS does not use Halon fire suppression as 
Halon can not be effectively removed from the cabin air 
and there are long term issues with toxicity and 
corrosiveness of the halogen acids.  ISS instead utilizes 
a carbon dioxide fire suppressor which when used can 
flood either avionics racks or modules with carbon 
dioxide and starve the fire of oxygen.  
CEV FIRE APPROACH 
One common fire protection approach for both past and 
present manned space vehicle is the separation of the 
avionics bay and the crew cabin.  The same approach 
can be taken with the CEV Command Module, 
separating it into a crew cabin and the closed-out 
avionics bays.  Because both areas have different air 
ventilation, configuration, and accessibility conditions, it 
is prudent to develop different fire protection strategies 
for each of these areas.  The crew cabin, being the area 
where the crew resides, has strict air ventilation 
requirements and is composed of accessible, open 
space for the crew to live and work in.  The closed-out 
avionics bay areas are crammed with high powered 
electrical and electromechanical systems on cold plates, 
and there is normally no air ventilation requirement and 
no crew accessibility requirement.  
CREW CABIN 
To begin any fire protection strategy, fire prevention is 
still the basis.  This was done in Apollo era through strict 
material and ignition control and is still done to date.  But 
it has also been recognized that strict use of 
nonflammable materials in the crewed area is always 
difficult.  Some materials, like clothing and books, will be 
onboard even though they do not meet non-flammable 
requirements.  But as long as they are kept a safe 
distance away from ignition sources the risk is greatly 
reduced.  Strict ignition control in the crew cabin involves 
testing of electronic devices to insure fire containment 
and closing off high-powered avionics boxes and wire 
bundles from the cabin. 
The crew habitable area has strict ventilation 
requirements to allow proper mixing and cooling of the 
cabin atmosphere.  Ventilation is required while the crew 
is in the CEV, docked to the ISS, or docked to the Lunar 
Surface Access Module (LSAM).  This ventilation allows 
and requires the use of a particle smoke detector similar 
to the Shuttle or ISS to shut down the ventilation at the 
detection of fire.  As seen in previous experience, 
ventilation in microgravity will always increase fire 
propagation risk while the lack of ventilation increases 
self extinguishment.  Shutting down air ventilation also 
protects the air revitalization system from toxic gases 
generated by the fire.   
Due to the small size of the CEV crew cabin, a gaseous 
fire suppression system such as Halon or carbon dioxide 
poses a hazard to the crew.  Not only is the high Halon 
exposure level risk for the crew, there is no way to 
remove the Halon except thorough depressurization of 
the cabin.  Carbon dioxide levels required to suffocate a 
fire can also suffocate the crew.  This leads the CEV to 
consider a water foam fire extinguisher in the crew cabin 
as in Apollo and Skylab.  Water foam is highly effective 
when pointed at a fire and has the added advantages of 
cooling the heat generated by a fire event. 
CLOSED-OUT AVIONICS BAY 
The CEV CM, like Apollo, must have the capability to 
depressurize to vacuum.  Due to this necessity, any high 
powered electrical or electromechanical devices that 
require cooling cannot rely on air ventilation cooling, 
instead they utilize cold plates.  As a result, there is no 
forced air ventilation in the closed-out avionics bays 
making conventional particulate smoke detection 
impractical.  Smoke detection is necessary in air 
ventilated avionics bay on the Shuttle and ISS to shut 
down the airflow, but in avionic bays that don’t have 
forced air ventilation, particulate smoke detection isn’t 
provided nor is it necessary.   
Due to the lack of fire detection, avionics bays will rely 
on three levels of protection: FDIR system architecture, 
EEE parts de-rating and current protection, and non-
flammable materials selection.  This fire protection 
strategy for avionics bays is currently used on both 
Shuttle and ISS for racks that don’t have forced air 
ventilation.   
However, both the Shuttle and ISS racks have fire ports 
that allow the use of an external handheld fire 
extinguisher as a worst case precaution.  To effectively 
use fire ports, two conditions must exist: the ability to 
quickly access the fire ports, and an effective fire 
extinguisher that can flood the avionic bay no matter 
where the fire is located.  Both of these conditions are 
difficult to meet for the CEV.  The CEV is a small vehicle 
with limited wall space.  Fire port access requires the 
area surrounding the fire port to be kept clear at all 
times, limiting crew storage area and space.  Water-
foam extinguishers are not as effective in flooding 
avionics bay volumes and as a result, a gas suppressant 
based fire extinguisher is necessary.  The other option is 
to have a manually activated fire extinguisher in the 
close-out bays instead of using the fire ports.  This will 
still allow the ability to have a backup fire suppression 
system that can be activated by the crew or by ground 
control if necessary. 
The decision to activate the fire suppression system 
needs to be carefully considered.  When discharging, 
gaseous based fire suppression will create forced airflow 
that can stir up an already dying fire giving it a second 
life before extinguishing it, or even worse, it can force a 
fire into a smoldering event that doesn’t require oxygen.  
Generally, the fire extinguisher is only discharged when 
there is a confirmed fire event happening at the current 
time.  If it can be sufficiently proven that the closed-out 
avionics bays in the worst case oxygen atmosphere with 
a fire ignition will not allow the fire to propagate due to 
materials selection and electrical and electromechanical 
enclosure design, then the fire suppression system is 
not necessary.  One way to gain assurance that a fire 
will not propagate in a worst case environment is to add 
margin to the flammability requirement.  For example, 
testing and using materials and equipment enclosures 
that are tested and proven to be nonflammable in a 40% 
oxygen, 10.2 psia atmosphere will give greater 
assurance for the material in a 30% oxygen atmosphere.   
CONCLUSION 
A quick evaluation of past and present fire protection 
methods on different vehicle shows the evolving nature 
of fire protection methods.  As technology and 
understanding of fires in microgravity progresses, new 
and better fire protection methods continue to be 
developed.  The CEV will require a fire prevention 
strategy that is similar to the Apollo CM, while 
technology has allowed better Fire Detection and 
Suppression (FDS) systems than Apollo ever had.  
Utilizing new technologies and better understanding of 
fire in microgravity will enable the CEV to have a 
successful fire protection system while minimizing risk 
and dangers to the crew.   
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